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OPERATION SALAM

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مكتب منسق الأمم المتحدة لبرامج
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المتصلة بأفغانستان

Bureau du Coordonnateur des programmes
d'assistance humanitaire et économique des
Nations Unies relatifs à l'Afghanistan

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Note: For technical reasons, the maps mentioned in the text could not be reproduced in this version of the report.

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I Summary of Conclusions

1. The Province of Herat seems to offer the social and political coherence that would allow the international community to implement successfully regional rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes as soon as hostilities have ceased.

2. During the initial phase, humanitarian assistance is possible and desirable in areas where relative security conditions already exist. The Ghorian and Zindejan areas seem to correspond to that definition.

3. Such assistance should, in this initial phase, have the following characteristics:

   3.1. small simple-technology projects
   3.2. quick-action approach aimed at vulnerable groups
   3.3. projects aimed at testing delivery and absorption capacities

4. An essential condition for assistance is the effective establishment of an international presence through extended missions to the area by personnel from concerned agencies. NGOs offer a most valuable support to the operations but a U.N. presence would be perceived as more acceptable by the local authorities.

5. The mission stresses the importance of direct discussions with Afghan leaders based in the region. Intermediaries (even of Afghan origin) located outside Afghanistan do not necessarily enjoy the confidence of regional leaders.

6. Implementation of programme needs to rely on civilian entities that are truly representative of the population and existing power structures.

7. U.N. activities should be carried out in parallel to - and not in competition with - indigenous structures and personalities.

8. Other recommendations of a sectoral nature appear at the end of each section of this report.

II. Background on the Area Visited

1. The area visited by the mission is situated between the Iranian border, the city of Herat, the asphalted road from Herat to Iran and the 34th parallel.

2. From the border to Ghorian the area is desert, with some nomads (Persian-speaking Murzay tribe). From Ghorian to Herat the area is flat and was densely populated before the war. Ghorian was a big bazaar. Zindejan is still a populated town. Villages get more and more numerous as one gets closer to Herat.

3. Agriculture is the main activity in the area; there is artisanal silk production in Zindejan.

4. Almost all villages within a radius of 20 kms. from Herat have been destroyed.

5. The population is composed mainly of Persian-speaking Sunnis with a significant Shi'a minority (between 5 to 10%). Some small ethnic groups are scattered along the asphalted road (Pashtuns, Turkmen, Baluch and Hazaras, going West to East).

6. Politically, the area is dominated by Jamiat-Islami under the command of Ismail Khan, with the exception of the Shi'as who belong mainly to the Hezbollah. The isolated ethnic groups tend to join the government militias (Pashtun Alizay and Baluch). Some other Mujahedin groups (Khales) are represented in Ghorian. Ismail Khan is nevertheless the sole leader administrating the area and able to ensure security and mobility. He is popular, has good organizational skills and commands a strong military force. The mission was received by a group of 1,000 armed mujahedin under Ismail. The Hezbollah has fewer fighters in the same area and cannot provide similar security. It would be difficult to organize a programme in the area which is objected to by Ismail Khan.

III. Administration and Political Structures

1. The military and political administration of Ismail Khan is called "Amiriyat" (the Amirat). Its authority appears to cover the following provinces:

- All of Herat province
- Western Bedghis
- West and North Farah
- West and North Ghor

It also extends to varying degrees into:

- North Nimruz
- North Helmand

2. The Amirat is headed by Ismail Khan assisted by two deputies:

- Ala'uddin is the head of the Hamza Division (military forces), he has also represented Ismail Khan abroad on some occasions.
- Aji Mir Khaleq, 55, a former professor of theology.

3. This administrative structure covers three levels:

- Emirat
- District
- Village

4. The Emirat includes ten or eleven committees as follows:

- Finance ("Mali"): Ahmad Jan
- Agriculture ("Zera'Ati"): Gholma Nabi the most important Committee, dealing with social affairs and infrastructure (canals-roads, etc...)
- Education ("Ta'Lim"): schools
- Culture ("Farhangi"): propaganda

- Justice ("Qaza'Y"): Mollah Mohammad is the leader. The committee is run by Ulemas graduated from Shariat schools.

- Political Affairs ("syassi"): mainly deals with external elements (other parties or Iran)

- Military ("Nezami")

- ("Ettela'at"): intelligence.

- Health ("Sehat"): Doctor Nur Gul Nuri runs the hospitals

- Inquiries ("Tahqiq & Barassi"): This is in fact a police department for checking defectors and may be included under the justice Committee.

- Political organization ("da' wat a Tanzim"): aimed at controlling the party's organization. It has the role of the "political commissars".

- Logistics and road building: works mainly for military purposes.

5. District: Theoretically every district has as many district committees as the existing committees at the Emirat level. Finance, health, agriculture, justice, military and education seem to be invariably present, but the political inquiries and cultural committees are frequently missing.

6. Village: Generally, there is no committee structure. Instead, a Mujahidin commander is appointed by Ismail Khan from amongst the local people. He has both military and political authority, but no judicial powers and he must report to the district level for deciding on important issues.

7. Traditional forms of political powers co-exist with the Mujahidin organization:

- Elders: without their consensus, the Mujahedin commander has no influence
- Mollahs: exert moral authority
- Khans or influential wealthy people: their power has largely declined.

8. Ismail Khan has the attitude both of a political statesman and of a traditional leader. As a statesman he advocates a strong central government with an effective army and administration. He refuses to play the ethnic and tribal game. He refuses to establish any kind of separate entity in West Afghanistan. He has established the embryo of an administration. As a traditional leader, he emphasizes personal relations, is involved in details and distributes himself help to the families of martyrs. Prestige is a part of his power. Any attempt to bypass him would meet strong opposition. Ismail Khan would prefer not to be helped than to see the help impeding his authority.

9. For Ismail Khan the priority is still the war. During discussions, he gave the green light to UN action on the following conditions:

- Direct dealings between UN and himself; a common UN office (representing all related UN agencies) in Herat.

- No Iranian influence in the conception and implementation of UN assisted programmes.

The Hezbollah

1. The Hezbollah is a purely Shi'a local party founded in 1980 through direct Iranian support. It recruits mainly among young educated Shi'as from Herat city and remains a small group (with an estimated 200 mujahedin). Due to heavy bombings, the Hezbollah had to withdraw from Herat's suburbs in 1983-1984. It is now established in the ruins of a dozen formerly Shi'a populated villages West of Herat.

2. The Hezbollah controlled areas which offer the basis for local development projects are located in some villages:

- Nogre-ye Hazara: 100 families
- Rabat Sawrestan: 50 families
- Kharduzdah: a few families
- Qale E Akhunda: a few families
- Razeshak E Hazara: a few families
- Rabat E Kashmir: a few hundred families

3. In the case of a return of the population, Hezbollah might control between 2,000 and 7,000 families.

4. It is to be noted that most of the villages with a Shi'a population are in fact mixed (with Sunnis). Shi'as consisute approximately 5% to 10% of the Herat province population. Hezbollah is supported since all groups deserve to be assisted.

5. The Hezbollah is headed locally by Mahbub Kateb and Yaqub Ali Rustapur who want direct help without control of or mediation by external elements. Hezbollah's leaders consider themselves to be first of all Afghans whose ambitions however represent the interests of the Shi'a minority in Herat without references to outside authorities.

IV. Population Movements

1. There are no reliable sources of information concerning statistics of either refugees from Herat province or displaced persons within the same province. In the opinion of commander Ismail Khan, some 200,000 to 250,000 persons from Herat province would have sought refuge in Iran and will eventually wish to return. It is believed that the number of internally-displaced persons could be even higher. The de-population factor obviously varies from one area to the other but, as a general rule, areas such as the west and south-west of Herat city where intense fighting and shelling occurred are seriously depopulated. The following examples give an indication of this situation:

Ghopian, which was abandoned by government forces only six to eight months ago, now has a population that represents roughly 20% of the 5,000 family pre-war population.

In contrast, villages such as Bazerguan and Hazara (near Nugra) which are located close to Herat and where destruction has been intensive have only 15% left of their pre-war populations.

Most of the Shi'a population in the imediate vicinity of Herat city has been displaced. Between 2,000 and 7,000 families could come back to those areas now controlled by the Hezbollah, once security has been fully restored. It is also significant to note that, according to Mujahedin commanders near Herat City, the population of that city would now be lower than its pre-war total of 250,000.

2. The three years from 1984 to 1986 are described as the worst years as regards fighting and destruction. This is also the period during which most of the exodus has taken place. There does not seem to be a pattern where refugees from a same village would seek to remain grouped once they reach Iran.

3. As already noted by previous missions to Afghanistan, the need of returning refugees can hardly be disassocited from the needs of internally displaced persons. In terms of priorities, such needs could be described as follows:

3.1 Shelter: Reconstruction of destroyed houses; according to community leaders, "scouts" would be sent in advance of families in order to undertake this reconstruction, thereby reducing considerably the need for temporary shelter (tents and tarpaulins); credit schemes, cash grants or food-for-work could be explored to facilitate this task.

3.2. Revival of agriculture: This is already under way in most areas but could be further promoted through the provision of hand tools (for the maintenance of irrigation systems), seeds and fertilizers.

3.3 The return of some one-third of the pre-war population will also have an effect on community services as well as possible negative consequences on the prices of a number of commodities. During a certain period, international food assistance could be used as a stabilizing factor.

4. Prospects for repatriation: The cessation of hostilities and in particular air attacks is a pre-condition to large-scale repatriation. There are no signs yet of any large-scale returns. However, the movement of internally-displaced persons back to their villages has already started in some of the villages visited by the mission.

5. <u>Conclusions and recommendations</u>

5.1. The return of refugees will most probably be more orderly than anticipated. The Jamiat commander is quite confident that return movements can be regulated by his party. As a result, the need for stockpiling of shelter material in Iran is much less than initially planned. Subject to the eventual establishment of a presence inside Herat Province, this could also be done within Afghanistan itself (Ghorian or Zindejan).

5.2. Displaced persons are already returning to certain villages and need assistance in terms of food, reconstruction of houses and agricultural implements.

V. Agriculture and Food

1. The area visited runs along the Hari Rud river and contains agricultural land with extensive irrigation systems, fed mainly by the river, through a system of canals. There is also some dry farming. Despite the depopulation or perhaps because of it, there appears to be sufficient wheat and other staples produced in the area to meet local needs at subsistence level. No figures were available for overall agricultural production. Prices and related agricultural data are provided in Appendix 4. Vegetable oil, sugar, and practically everything else is in short supply.

2. Diet: The local diet and questions of nutrition are discussed in the chapter on health. The diet is poor, monotonous, and lacking in essential variety. The region visited is nevertheless regarded as comparatively well-endowed. There is no starvation.

3. Market systems: Due to depopulation and the constant threat of bombing, storage is dispersed, and the market system has largely gone underground. The Jamiat administration, the Amirat, under the direction of the Committee on Agriculture keeps food distribution and prices under close review. For instance, wheat supplies to the region are assured by the twin policies of encouraging the Mujahedin to carry on cultivation in the lands vacated by farmers fleeing the war, and by preventing the sale of the produce to Herat city, where the government authorities offer a higher price.

4. Irrigation: Overall in Herat province, 80% of irrigated lands are river-fed. Kerez (traditional linked-wells) and natural springs supply the remaining 20%. It is the opinion of the mission that repair and maintenance of the minor canal systems as well as routine work on kerezes could be left to the returning population. An organized programme of reconstruction, perhaps involving food for work, could be envisaged for the larger canal systems, including the Enjil canal and the Ju-e-Now after further feasibility studies. Repair to the kerezes was not given prioirity by the local leaders, perhaps because kerez feed under 20% of irrigation systems and also because kerez know-how is available locally. Kerez-fed lands are probably too valuable to be neglected for long. It was proposed to the mission that the quickest way of bringing more land under cultivation would be through the provision of pumps.

5. Agricultural improvements, plant disease, infestation: The mission was in the field at a time of the year when most observations relating to yield, infestation, etc. could not be made at first hand. However, it is clear that little action has been taken since the revolution to improve or reinforce seed varieties (although a system of local exchange of seed is apparently in operation), or to use insecticides and pesticides, or to use chemical fertilizers. The main fertilizer in use is the droppings collected at the remarkable pigeon towers, which apparently yield sufficient fertilizer for application to two hectares a month per tower. The list of plant diseases mentioned is attached in Appendix 4. Mice and rats are apparently major pests, affecting wheat stores and pistachio orchards. There was no evidence of locust infestation. Reports of a heavy attack in Baghdis some months ago were checked. Apparently the crops were destroyed not by locusts but by beetles.

6. Livestock: Again, no overall figures were available, but it is believed that along with the depopulation there has been a gradual depletion of livestock. An interesting consequence of this is the regeneration of natural fodder and brushwood used for cooking. Among livestock, cattle are most in demand, and the observation was made to the mission that each cow or ox could provide employment to one person. Ismail Khan wished he could have 1,000 cows to distribute to the destitute. Oxen for use in the field are sold at 90,000 Afghanis.

7. Approach to assistance: The regeneration of agriculture is seen by the local leadership as playing a vital role in the eventual return to normality. But this in turn depends upon the return of the population. At present there are only the earliest signs of return. Major plans for assisting agricultural development will in any case have to wait until the local leadership is prepared to consider them. There is little anticipation, even a failure to conceive a massive return of the refugees and the displaced, for the following

reasons: the Mujahedin are at war, which is their major preoccupation. Returnees are conceived as individuals, and not "en masse", with each person having a kin to look after upon his return. Certainly, when they do return, there will be a period when food assistance will be needed, until local production catches up with demand. However, at present, even the construction of warehousing is not advisable as long as the threat of aerial bombardment persists.

The other prior question apart from the question of the return of the population concerns access: the movement of any sizeable quantity of assistance into this area will have to wait until the question of access is clarified. This question is dealt with in Chapter 10 below. It is sufficient to note here that the problem of access might be resolved eventually by the construction or repair of roads. It is recommended that FFW schemes of this kind should be given serious consideration.

9. Conclusions and recommendations

9.1. Purpose: Food assistance should be based on a clear appreciation of the reality of the prevailing situation. Thus the initial supply of food assistance should be regarded as part of a confidence-building exercise. The local authorities should be allowed maximum flexibility in the use of such assitance.

9.2. Timing: The first consignment, however small, should reach the area as soon as possible.

9.3. Quantity: As mentioned above, it is the promptness of response and not the size that counts in the first instance.

9.4. Commodities: Vegetable oil (in a solidified form, as used in the area), sugar and tea are commodities most in demand.

9.5 Project-related assistance: Part of the initial supply should be linked to UNICEF's vulnerable group and school-feeding programmes. In this context, the supply of powdered milk for making yoghurt, or enriched biscuits should also be considered.

9.6 FFW: This seems feasible, especially in connection with road building/repair and canal repair.

9.7 Monetization: Consideration should be given to an appropriate "monetization" scheme. For example, in view of the shortage of vegetable oil in the area, the donation of a small quantity of oil to the local authorities (or rather two separate donations, one to the Amirat and one to the Hezbollah authorities) may be considered, part for sale at a suitably low price in the local market, and part for free distribution. Monitoring (which is virtually impossible at present) will be limited to observing the effect this intervention would have on the price of oil in the local market.

9.8. The appropriate UN agencies should be alerted to the agricultural and horticultural requirements of the region, especially with regard to the provision of improved seed varieties, fertilizer, agricultural machinery, measures to improve animal husbandry, the provision of insecticides, further investigation of the state of the oil (which appears highly saline in certain regions) etc...

VI. Health

1. Health conditions are extremely poor. The population in general, including women and children, is subject to major health diseases such as TB, typhoid, dysentery, cholera, malaria and leprosy. Many of these diseases are, as usual, water-borne and arise from poor hygienic conditions. Poor sanitation, polluted irrigation systems and well water are the basic underlying factors. The team got the impression that the Amirat's current priority is the war-wounded; although the Amirat and its Health Committee are aware of the seriousness of health problems in their area. In meeting the general health needs therefore, the UN agencies should take this factor into account and a two-track approach should be taken, in order not to overlook local priorities and preoccupations.

2. Health situation of women and children: The usual child diseases are largely present, such as poliomyelitis, whooping cough, early child tuberculosis, diphtheria, typhoid and trachoma. Although smallpox was mentioned, the mission could not find any evidence of it. In terms of women's illnesses, all the above-mentioned diseases affecting the adult population plus intra-uterine infections due to unhygienic conditions of delivery, and abscesses in the breast due to early infant death and abrupt stoppage of lactation were present. In terms of maternal mortality, the Health Committee reported 20% to 40% mortality at birth due to inability to extract the placenta. Neo-natal tetanus seems to be one of the highest causes of infant mortality going up to 500/thousand in the rural areas. Among the major infant mortality causes, the Director of the Health Committee also stated upper respiratory diseases, early pneumonia, diarrhoea and infliction of another sort, the bombardment.

3. Nutrition: In terms of nutrition, adults as well as children are suffering from monotonous diet, resulting in serious deficiencies resulting in turn in various vitaminosis and anaemia. The Health Co-ordinator underlined that in the female and child population especially, there was existence of serious anaemia and some cases of malnutrition. Again due to the diet, the population in general and especially the population at risk is suffering from serious iodine deficiency, and goitre seems to be quite prevalent, especially in the female population.

4. The usual diet consists consist of bread and soup. The latter consists of of onions, tomatoes, a bone or small piece of meat, oil or fat, in a watery base. In winter there is no meat, yoghurt or eggs. Thus, in winter, the meat or bone in the soup is replaced by pulses, when these are available.

5. In terms of nutrition for children, there is a tendency to breast feed on demand up to two years of age. The child is weaned at two, on the left-overs of adults. Children are not subject to regular meals; they are fed any time of the day. When sick, the child is not taken to a medical facility since because of a fatalistic attitude a child may be taken back by God at any moment.

6. On average women conceive and deliver ten times in their child-bearing age, but five children survive. Women do not consider that current conditions are suitable for child bearing. Therefore, an increasing number are taking contraceptive pills made available by the Amirat.

7. Health Infrastructure: According to the Health Committee there are 24 general hospitals and health clinics in Herat, in half of which surgical operations can be performed. But it seems that only a few of these could be considered as proper hospitals. These are the ones in Zindajan, Talao, Torankos, Chest. Of these, Zindajan hospital is run by Médecins sans Frontières (MSF). The general pattern is to have three medical doctors, three nurses, and one paramedic per hospital. The maximum number of beds is ten per hospital. In a clinic/health centre there is usually one medical doctor and one nurse. The total medical and paramedical personnel in Herat province is 106. Out of this, six are foreigners from MSF.

8. Availability of drugs: This seems to be basically sufficient for surgical operations but quite insufficient for general health purposes,

including the treatment of major diseases. Seventy percent of drugs are obtained from Herat city government-controlled areas by special arrangement of the Amirat. The Health Committee indicated that they were spending approximately 10 million Afghanis per year. The Committee also indicated that 15-20 million Afghanis were spent on hospital equipment, which was obtained mainly from Iran. These figures seem high to the team, except that war damage calls for constant re-equipment.

9. Traditional medicine: A traditional system of medicine based on the ancient Greek or Unani system exists, but in an attenuated form. One manifestation of this system which continues to have a positive impact is the system of traditional birth attendance. Midwives seem to be frequently contacted, on an *ad hoc* basis, by the Health Committee for so-called "training".

10. Conclusions and recommendations: The health situation in the areas visited by the team seems to be extremely poor for adults as well as for children. It seems that a basic local health infrastructure already exists. The Health Committee should be taken on as a counterpart for any health programme by the UN agencies. One of the major objectives of UN institutions dealing with health issues should be to gain the confidence of this health authority. Immediate actions to be taken are:

10.1 The launching of systematic immunization.

10.2 Basic health and hygienic measures such as control of water-borne diseases through the supply of clean water.

10.3 The introduction of basic hygiene procedures such as using soap and systematically washing hands and kitchen ustensils as well as the hygenic preparation of food.

10.4 Improvement of diet and nutritional status, especially of the vulnerable groups and support with the provisions of various vitamins, calcium and iodine supplies.

10.5 Advocacy of infant care and extension of immunization to infants and mothers.

10.6. Immediate supply of essential drugs for hospitals and clinics, sufficient for six months.

10.7 Immediate supply of basic medical equipment to clinics to improve sterilization and hygiene and to facilitate medical acts and operations, in order to meet the needs not only of the war-wounded but also of the sick in general.

10.8 Rapid training of doctors and para-medics and especially females for women/children's health problems.

VII. Education

1. It is significant that Ismail Khan mentioned education as his first priority, giving it precedence over food or the revival of agriculture or health. But it is likely that he sees UN intervention in this sector as much less compromising in terms of maintaining cultural identity. Furthermore, Ismail Khan's requirements in education are confined to the provision of educational materials, without interference in the content and curriculum. This sensitivity stems from the fact that the first institutions to be destroyed after the revolution were the schools. All attempts to rebuild the education system should therefore be made with care.

2. West Herat has twenty schools, mostly started six months ago. Herat Province as a whole (excluding Herat city) has 31 schools with 2,500 children, including 200 girls, as follows:

Obe district: 7 schools
Zindajan: 8
Gorgan: 12 (including 4 mixed schools)
Pastun Zargun: 4

3. All are primary schools; there are no secondary schools. Some of the schools work two shifts. Typically each school has a head teacher, 3 teachers and a mullah. In the school visited by the team in Gorgan, there were 170 boys and 70 girls. In Zindajan there is an all-girl school.

4. There is an extreme shortage of all teaching materials. It is said that Iran has blocked transit of textbooks produced in Peshawar by the Jamiat. There is also a shortage of teachers, partly due to the inability of the authorities to pay salaries. The Director of the Amirat Education Committee specifically requested the team to provide financial assistance for this purpose.

5. The curriculum consists of the Koran, Farsi, arithmetic, drawing, the war and praise of the Mujahedin. The Director of the Amirat Education Committee was disinclined to discuss the curriculum with the mission.

6. Recommendations:

6.1 Immediate supply of essential school materials such as pencils, paper notebooks, blackboards and other basic primary school material.

6.2 Supply of all developed curricula acceptable to the authorities in Herat.

6.3 Material help for rebuilding schools and provision of simple equipment as listed in 6.1 above.

6.4 Subsidy but not full salary in order to top up teachers' salary. The team recommends that the Amirat should continue to make the basic contribution towards salaries and the UN top these up to bring them to an acceptable level. This proposal is made with reservations, only because shortage of teachers poses a serious bottleneck. It should not be regarded as setting a precedent. It will be discussed with the local authorities as soon as possible to find a way to take the UN system out of a salary scheme.

6.5 Quick training of teachers

6.6 School feeding programme.

VIII. Shelter

There is no need for large quantities of construction materials for the reconstruction of shelter in Herat province.

1. The mission was not able to visit Herat town in order to asses the urban damage where construction materials may be needed.

2. The rural towns and villages in the assessment area are all constructed in the traditional mud and sun-dried mud brick form. There is no wood or other construction materials used for the roofing other than mud and sun-dried mud brick. The mission observed very limited needs for wood which is mainly being used for doors, frames and shutters.

3. Some very limited amounts of wood for door frames and shutters may be required. However no one expressed this need.

4. The average family size in Herat appears to be in the range of 7 to 10 persons. This is due to the extended family concept. The shelter in most larger houses visited by the mission also includes shelter for animals.

5. The mission was informed that the cost of construction of one average-sized house is from Afghanis 200,000 to 1,000,000. Further cost breakdowns are as follows:

(a) cost of a mason:	Afghanis 2,000 per day.
(b) cost of skilled labour:	Afghanis 1,500 per day
(c) cost of daily labourer:	Afghanis 500 per day.

6. The cost of sun-dried bricks was not mentioned. However the main material, mud, is readily available at source. Apparently the excellent form of architecture and construction techniques utilized in Herat province is well known by the local population hence no foreign expert appears to be warranted.

7. Although the reaction of the local leaders to the proposed addition of PH latrines to reconstructed shelter was non-committal, the mission feels that this is an objective that should be pursued.

Recommendations:

1. Modest supply of wood for doors, frames and shutters.

2. Construction tools such as shovels, etc. In regard to shovels, the mission was informed that they are available in Herat. However, it would appear that a substantial requirement for construction hand tools may be needed.

3. The provision of cash grants for reconstruction of shelter may be considered as a means of encouragement as clearly the lack of capital may be one of the main impediments towards speedy shelter reconstruction. Such an imput may also increase the circulation of wealth for labourers as well as other allied work forces and may very well be one of the main inputs towards the regeneration of economic activity in the province.

IX. Energy

There is no need for the provision of fuel for cooking or heating in the Herat area in the immediate future according to Afghan leaders

1. Traditional fuel for cooking and heating

Due to the reduction in the number of the animal population over the course of the war in Herat province there has been a considerable reduction in grazing. The heavy depopulation of the villages and towns have also led to a regeneration of the forest and bush environment. As a consequence, the environment has over the course of some 9 years had a chance to regenerate so that there does not appear to be any shortage of the traditional brush bush that is the main fuel for cooking. It is claimed that even with the return of the original population of pre- war levels there would be enough traditional brush wood fuel for the foreseeable immediate future.

Recommendation:

A re-afforestation programme aimed at the provision of firewood in 3 to 4 years time, when the return of the population and increased number of animals are again expected to pose a danger to the environment. Another traditional cooking fuel is animal dung. The mission observed considerable amounts of this energy source being utilized by the local population for cooking.

2. Kerosene

Kerosene is also used for some cooking but it is limited since the cost appears to be prohibitive for most Afghan families. However, it is used for lighting. The mission was informed that it is available from Iran as well as Herat. There does not appear to be any shortage.

3. Petrol and diesel

Fuel for vehicles and trucks seems to be available. The source appears to be Iran. The mission did see some vehicle traffic in the form of buses and trucks but not in any substantial numbers. Unless a massive assistance programme is foreseen, which at this stage does not appear to be justified, no immediate provision of diesel or petrol for the population is required. Due to the state of the roads as well as the security and political constraints, an immediate decision concerning the stockpiling of diesel or petrol for operations need not be taken.

X. Logistics

The question of access raises a number of political and security related problems.

1 The question of access to the area from Iran has not yet been resolved with the Iranian authorities. The local authorities in Herat have, for the past eight years, witnessed considerable difficulties in opening up a route through Iran. These difficulties apply not only to the majority of Sunni local authorities, but to the minority Shi'as as well. For example, the main local authority, the Jamiat Islami, has a consignment of school books routed from Pakistan via Iran which has been blocked for the past three months.

2. Due to the present state of affairs in regard to access from Iran, as well as past experience, the local authority has begun the construction of a dirt road from Zindajan to the Helmand river. This track is not complete and work is expected to resume during the spring. It will be a seasonal track and is not expected to be operational during the winter (December to late March). A further impediment is the Helmand river. The mission was informed that a ferry with 8-ton capacity is operating on the river. This ferry is not capable of transporting trucks. The consignments are unloaded and ferried across the river on the other side of the river. On the other side of the river, a limited number of trucks are available to continue with the cargo until Chardan. The usual method of transport on this route appears to be by pack animals. Trucks can travel from Chaman to the Helmand river.

3. A further impediment is the existence of several uncontrolled Mujahedin groups. These operate in the area from the Pakistan border to the Helmand river and between the East and South East of Herat city.

4. According to the local authorities, the main highway from Kandahar to Herat is not expected to be secure until even after the expected withdrawal of Soviet forces in February 1989, as it is apparently expected to continue to be plagued by unaffiliated armed bands who are more or less bandits. The question of its use also poses an apparent political problem with the local authorities.

5. Air transport

The use of Herat as a staging area for logistics poses a political problem with the local authorities. It may not be possible to use it until after the question of its political status is resolved.

6. Observations

6.1 All groups agree that the best possible transit route remains via Iran. The Musa Abad-Ghorian route is difficult but can be easily repaired through food-for-work and a modest component of graders, compactors, etc. The problem is not a technical but a political one.

6.2 The present route from Pakistan is seasonal. MSF, who are based in Zindajan, stated that it took their team some six weeks to cover the route. The Helmand river poses a considerable barrier to trucking unless an adequate bridge can be constructed. A serious assessment of the track is needed. It is understood that food-for-work may be possible for its construction and for its maintenance. The possibility of using the Government-controlled bridge may have to be explored.

6.3 Even with the withdrawal of Soviet forces, it is not known when the main highway may be secure.

6.4 Air bridges do not appear to be politically acceptable as long as the only airfields are the ones at Herat and Shindand.

7. Recommendations

7.1 Continue to cultivate the Iranian authorities for access to the area in order to ensure that the local authorities in Herat do not consider transit to be politically motivated in favour of one country or party.

7.2 Assist in the construction and maintenance of the Pakistan route.

7.3 Study the possibility of a pontoon bridge or larger ferry on the Helmand river.

7.4 Explore the possibility of using the Government-controlled bridge.

XI. MINES

1. The mission discovered that, in Herat province, mines are located in specific, well-identified areas. They do not therefore pose a random and widespread risk to man and beast.

2. The majority of minefields are located in the first and second security belts established by the Government forces to the west of Herat city (see map). There are also minefields around Gorian and Zindajan townships. These have been sown by the Mujahedin.

3. According to Mujahedin sources, most of the mines in the first security belt around Herat city are concentrated around Government posts. Fifty per cent of these have been cleared. There are, however, certain identified localities in the mountainous regions north of Herat city, in the Larzha region, where an important Soviet post is located, where there is a suspicion of mines. But the people have learned to avoid them.

4. It is stated that the mines planted by the Soviet forces, as described above, are all anti-personnel and comprise variously 200 gm., 500 gm. and 2 kg. varieties. The Soviet forces would not have planted anti-tank mines.

5. The Mujahedin themselves would have sown mines around Gorian and Zindajan townships, as well as about 70,000 in the first security belt around Herat city, in the area where Government forces circulate. Mujahedin-planted mines are mostly of the anti-tank variety. The Mujahedin claim that they know the exact location of all mines planted by them.

6. The Mujahedin have no modern mine-detecting equipment. In the past they have tried using simple metal detectors but, since the fields are usually littered with other metallic objects of war, this method has not proved very successful. Nevertheless, in the past three months, employing this and other methods described below, they have defused 10,000 mines, mainly from the

second belt, as well as some parts of the first belt. The most common method used to defuse mines is to prod the ground with sticks. When the stick touches an object suspected to be a mine, it is dug up. Needless to say, this is a hazardous and time-consuming method. The prodding sometimes sets off the mine resulting in casualties; at other times stones and other objects are dug up. The mission also came across a trained mine-sniffing dog. But generally, dogs are not trained for this purpose.

7. Defusing Mujahedin-planted mines poses no problem. The Mujahedin know the locations and are expert enough to defuse these at the appropriate time.

8. Some time has passed since the planting of Soviet mines in the first belt and earth and grass has started to cover all traces. In some cases, the mines are by now 60 cm. underground. The Mujahedin consider, however, that by using sophisticated detectors, de-mining can be accomplished in such cases also. The quickest and safest way is to use a tank-town mine plough.

9. All the mines in question are of the metallic variety. For further information and pictures of various mines, please see Map 2 at the end of this report.

10. In the context of mines, a related potential hazard must be mentioned. It arises from unexploded bombs and grenades, especially those which have sunk deep into soft earth without exploding. Some of these bombs have already been located; others, no one know how many, remain unlocated.

11. <u>Conclusion and recommendation</u>

Since mines in this region are located in specific areas which are well-identified, there is no need for either an information campaign to draw the attention of the general public to the mines or of instituting a programme of training in mine-detection.

An arrangement for a tank-town mine plough should be made.

Appendix 1

Mission Members

A. Yalgin	UNOCA (team leader)
E. Birerdinc	(UNICEF)
C. Faubert	(UNHCR)
M. Hyder	(WFP)
C. Lobato	UNOCA
E. Menemencioglu	(UNHCR)
O. Roy	UNOCA

Appendix 2

Guiding Principles of the Mission

1. Link projects to what mission actually observes in the field

2. Look for implementing partners, especially those inside Afghanistan

3. Draw up a political map of the area: who controls what, etc.

4. Assess/establish levels of destruction

5. Explore possibility of alternative routes

6. Explore conditions for future Salam missions

7. Assess movement of population

8. Explore the possibility of co-operating with NGOs

9. Look out for things of value to other UN agencies

10. Examine existing institutions: schools, clinics, warehouses, etc.

Appendix 3

Contacts with Afghans

1. The Jamiat

Ismail Khan
Allauddin (Machad, Sept. 88)
Haji Mir Khalek
Masumi, Political Affairs
Ghulam Nabi, Agriculture Committee
Dr. Nur Gul Nuri, Health Committee
Zahir, Committee on mines
Ahmad Jan, Finance Committee

2. The Hezbollah

Qari Ahmad (called Yekdast) in Taybad and Zehnan
Commander Khaleb, provincial chief
Uagub Ali Rastapur, Deputy of the Hezbollah

3. Contacts in Iran

The representatives of Ismail Khan in Iran are Jan Agha (Tehran), Masumi and Masun (Mashad).
The representative of the Hezbollah is its leader, Qari Ahmad (Mashad).

4. Contacts in Pakistan

The representatives of Ismael Khan in Pakistan are Salahuddin in Quetta and Qari Fazl Ahmed in Peshawar. The Hezbollah is not represented in Pakistan.

Appendix 4

Agricultural Data

Current prices, except when expressed in "Mun" (1 Mun = 4 kg).
All prices expressed in Afghani are per kilo:

Commodity	Zindajan	Herat
Maize	80/mun	90/mun
Jow (Barley)	100/mun	120/mun
Rice	700/mun*	600/mun**
Potatoes		360/mun
Wheat	80/mun	90/mun
Veg. oil***		1000/mun
Eggs	8 per egg	20 per egg
Black tea	700/kg	700/kg
Green tea	800/kg	800/kg
Sugar	110/kg	100/kg
Salt	10/kg	10/kg
Yoghurt	30/kg	40/kg
Kerosene	30/kg	
Lamb's meat	350-400/kg	
Beef	250/kg	
Firewood	50/mun	

The following commodities are in short supply: black tea, sugar, vegetable oil, kerosene

* local brown long-grain
** Pakistani rice, lower quality
*** Solidified, sold in 16 kg. tins

Agricultural wages: Sharecroppers who are provided tools, draft animals, seeds, fertilizer traditionally give 3/4 of crop to landlord. Mujahedin working for the Amirat are given a better deal: around 50%. An unskilled

agricultural worker earns up to 500 Afghani/day silk factory (Zindajan): 150 Afghani/day (which was remarkably low probably due to shortage of work.

Appendix 4.1

Wheat is cultivated in all districts.

Rice is cultivated in Enjeel, Sozareh, Obe, Pushtun Zargun.

Types/seasons for wheat

Type	Planting	Harvest
Zafarani	Mezan	Saratan
Shahniyazi	"	"
Safedak	Akrab	"
Safedak Irani	"	"
Ioorkh Kusha	"	"
Zerati	"	"
Maxipak	"	"
Sia Khoshaval	Mezan	Hout
Boorkhushe	Akrab	Seratan

The Zafarani has apparently been abandoned. The commonest varieties are: Zerati and Sia Khusht (both irrigated varieties). Shahniyazi is used for dry farming.

There is a small amount of wheat imported from Iran via Goryan on an individual basis. No further information on quantity or price was available.

Wheat infestations

- Mice
- Beetle, called KASHAFAQ, attacks wheat when it is ripening. This beetle destroyed the Baghdis wheat crop recently.
- Zardi: an infection which has affected Herat recently.
- A weed, as described, which looks like wheat but gives a bad smell to the bread, which turns black if the weed gets mixed in.

Appendix 4.2

Types of solidified vegetable oil used in Herat

MARSA	16 kg	Turkey
UFA	16 kg	Turkey (via Soviet Union)
6 cons	16 kg	Singapore (palm oil)
		Price 4,500 A
DOYA	16 kg	Pakistan: Price 4000 A

Appendix 4.3

Teachers	4,000 p/m
Nurses	4,000 - 15,000 p/m
Skilled workers	3,000 - 6,000 p/m
Kerez workers	400 - 1,000/day
Canal cleaners	500/day
Kerez specialists ("Chakun")	1,500/day

Planting/Harvest

Wheat	November - June
Barley	November - end Spring

Cattle prices

These have quadrupled in the past two years.

Irrigation by district and by irrigation system employed

District	% River/Canal	% Karez	% Spring
	(100 percent wet farming in the following districts)		
Enjeel	60	40	
Gozareh	60	40	
Zindajan	70	30	
Goryan	75	25	
Khozan	100		
Pushtun Zargun	70	30	
Obé	80	20	
Shindand	50	25	25
Shast e Sharif	20	(rest dry farming)	
Khushk)	(40% irrigated, rest dry farming.		
Gulran)	Source of irrigation not specified)		
Farsin)			
Kulukh)			

Appendix 5

Salaries in the Medical Domain

Medical doctors with diploma	10-15 000 A/month
Medical assistant	8 000 A/month
Nurse	6-8 000 A/month
Assistant nurse	4 000 A/month
Helper, cleaner, cook	5 000 A/month

Appendix 6

Rates of Exchange and Weights and measures

Exchange rates

US$ 1 = 220 Afghani

5 Iranian Rials = 1 Afghani

Weights/Measures

1 Mun = 4 kg.

1 Hectare =-5 Jerib

Appendix 7

Reflections on the female condition in Afghanistan

Although women are apparently without authority, this does not mean that they lack power. This may be illustrated by their decision to have some children. The woman must be a mother to have status . It is in this context that the decision to "go on the pill" needs explanation. Only women with children take the pill in order not to have more children. This unusual act is partially explained by the fact that the women, who by staying on in Afghanistan, have co-opted the war. They have became Mujahedin and thus their decision to have fewer children. This decision illustrates dramatically their power and ability to impose their decision on the community.

This, in view of the foregoing, any reconstruction programme should take into account the power of women in their own domain. In their nature, women's approval is essential. Any health, hygiene or education programme needs their approval and co-operation. Nevertheless the general status of women is extremely precarious. They have almost no education, any economic power is limited to home management and, in human relations, power is associated with the raising of children. In terms of culture and tradition, woman is one of the key upholders. For all reconstruction efforts of Afghanistan, women, their convictions and vision of tradition have to be carefully taken into account. It is therefore obvious that women are to be considered as an important agent of social change and development.

Appendix 8

The Silk Factory in Zindajan

The Zindajan area is said to operate fifty factories or workshops producing silk thread. Previously there used to be about 100 workshops in the area, where 80% of the workers are said to be skilled in this trade. Unemployment is currently high and total production is down to 160 kg. of silk thread per day. Output and employment has been cut back mainly due to the lack of caterpillar eggs which are bred on the mulberry leaves produced locally in order to hatch and spin cocoons. The eggs are normally imported in 5 gm. packets. The official price is between 1,000 and 2,000 Afghani per packet. Due to scarcity, the black market price has risen to 7,500 Afghani and, despite this, demand outstrips supply. Currently the eggs are bought either from Korea or illegally from Iran. The preference expressed was for French eggs. If this bottleneck could be relieved, it was claimed that the silk factories could provide full-time employment to up to 1,000 workers. At present, the 50 factories still working are only operational one month in the year. The current rate of pay seems very low, at 150 Afghani per day.

The workshop visited had manually-operated wooden machines for spinning the thread. The owners of the 50 workshops have created a syndicate and negotiate jointly with the workers' representatives to arrive at the usual arrangements governing wages, hours, etc.

Appendix 10

Appendix 9

Salam I - Base Station Report

1. Geographical location of base station near entry point was very convenient. It offered direct link with local authorities involved with the operation. Also such proximity could, if necessary, facilitate quick intervention in case of emergency. The main drawback near the base to the arrangement was the presence of an airstrip.

NGOs in the Area

Médecins sans Frontières (MSF)

Solidarité Afghanistan (French)

AFRANE (not present during mission)

2. Condition and facilities offered complete freedom in setting up equipment. ... available for local or long distance calls. One serious technical drawback was the proximity of the local radio station which caused interference. Consequently the antenna had to be moved five times before a suitable position was identified. Throughout the mission there was no interference by the authorities, though they were regularly present and had to be updated on the progress of the mission.

3. Composition of mission base station: This comprised two local staff members, one for substantive communications with the authorities, one for general assistance, plus one international communications expert with long field experience, plus one international staff member who knows the country. This proved to be the ideal combination.

4. Communications: Technically, the base had optimum equipment. This allowed us to talk with Kabul and Pakistan and Geneva (with sitor). For missions inside Afghanistan, it is felt necessary to reconsider the type of equipment to be used in future (see technical report below).

5. Communication with mission: Although the mission should decide when, how and for what duration contacts should be made, a certain regularity is desirable. Other UN parties monitoring (Kabul-Pakistan in this case) should avoid detailed questioning over the radio. When one station is on stand-by, others should also be on stand-by. Salam base monitored the mission on a 24-hour basis.

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2. Condition and facilities offered to members of base. There was complete freedom in setting up equipment. A separate telephone line was made available for local or long distance calls. One serious technical drawback was the proximity of the local radio station which caused interference. Consequently the antenna had to be moved five times before a suitable position was identified. Throughout the mission there was no interference by the authorities, though they were regularly present and had to be updated on the progress of the mission.

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16. <u>Living conditions</u>: Location designated by Iran authorities was the local Red Crescent quarters. Conditions were bearable. However, the mission members (especially international staff) were constantly escorted by armed soldiers and not allowed to move alone "for their own security". No complaints were made since complete freedom was given in the use of communication equipment which was the primary purpose of the base.

<u>Authorities</u>: The presence of representatives from Tehran greatly helped and avoided possible interference by local officials who may not have been completely in the picture.

<u>Conclusion</u>: For future missions, similar arrangements should be made. A well organized and staffed base station can offer rapid and good co-ordination of communications and back-up support to missions.

Appendix 11

Technical report

Radio communications for Salam mission

Backpack transceivers used by Salam missions are not adapted for such hard trips (Yaesu FT 747).

The following negative points were found:

- Power requirement is too high (stby 1A/Ix 15A)
- Therefore bigger batteries are needed which means heavier load
- For operating on several frequences a tuner or better (since more efficient) is the adjustable dipol (type Hy-gain) although this increases weight
- Equipment fragile (not made for such trips)
- For non-technicians equipment too complicated
- 18-20 kg. all together but 100 watts output.

As alternative following equipment proposed:

Codan Backpack (Type 32...) with longwire antenna

- low power consumption (stby 0,1A/Tx2A)
- battery smaller
- built-in tuner
- easy to operate by non-technicians
- has special carrying bag
- approximately 6 kg (30 watts output)

However, the Codan is crystal-controlled and can have up to 10 fixed frequencies factory programmed. That means: once out in the field, the frequency cannot be changed in case of interference on pre-programmed channels. The factory needs 2-3 months to produce the desired crystals.

The Veasu FT 747 is synthesized and can be owner-programmed at any time between 2 and 30Mhz into 20 memory channels. For recharging the batteries, only solar panels would be suitable. A cable should always be provided to hook up the station direct to a car battery.

The best solution for a backpack would be Codan-type with a synthesizer.

The IC 700'Ç are not really made for mobile coms. (too heavy and too big).

Suggest Codan type 8525 with extended head and selcal.

All the proposed equipment was not available at short notice (2 weeks) when the Salam missions started.

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